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   Automation usage decisions (AUDs) were examined via a System 1–System 2 
framework.  This study examined intent errors, a type of suboptimal AUD, which occurs 
when the operator knowingly chooses an option with a lower probability for success.  The 
task, composed of a series of target-detection trials, simulated firing decisions that soldiers 
often make during combat.  Two hundred three individuals were randomly assigned to 
conditions in a 2 (Automation: No-aid, Aid) x 3 (Credit Points: 0, 3, 6) design.  Operators in 
the aid condition differed from those in the no-aid condition in that they could rely on 
“advice” from an error-free machine, a predominately S1 task.  Credit points, which had a 
monetary consequence, could be earned by correct (firing) decisions.  The dependent 
variables were the total of incorrect responses and the latency of responses.  Participants in 
the aid condition were predicted to have shorter response latencies and make fewer errors in 
comparison to those in the no-aid condition.  Additionally, operators were expected to have 
longer latencies when making incorrect than correct AUDs due to greater S2 involvement.  
Because prior research has indicated that S2 processing tends to increase as a function of task 
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consequence (Kahneman, 2011), a main effect for the credit points variable was also 
anticipated.  Results were consistent with the premise that the presence of an error-free 
machine produced fewer errors and shorter responses latencies from reliance on the S1 
system.  However, the availability of the machine only produced shorter response latencies 
when the operators’ AUD was correct.  If the AUD was incorrect latencies were longer in the 
aid than the no-aid condition.  The credit points variable was not statistically significant in 
any of the analyses.  Overall, this study demonstrated the value of an S1-S2 framework in 
helping to understand why humans make seemingly irrational choices when interacting with 
automated decision aids.  
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Abstract 
 
Automation usage decisions (AUDs) were examined via a System 1–System 2 framework.  
This study examined intent errors, a type of suboptimal AUD, which occurs when the 
operator knowingly chooses an option with a lower probability for success.  The task, 
composed of a series of target-detection trials, simulated firing decisions that soldiers often 
make during combat.  Two hundred three individuals were randomly assigned to conditions 
in a 2 (Automation: No-aid, Aid) x 3 (Credit Points: 0, 3, 6) design.  Operators in the aid 
condition differed from those in the no-aid condition in that they could rely on “advice” from 
an error-free machine, a predominately S1 task.  Credit points, which had a monetary 
consequence, could be earned by correct (firing) decisions.  The dependent variables were 
the total of incorrect responses and the latency of responses.  Participants in the aid condition 
were predicted to have shorter response latencies and make fewer errors in comparison to 
those in the no-aid condition.  Additionally, operators were expected to have longer latencies 
when making incorrect than correct AUDs due to greater S2 involvement.  Because prior 
research has indicated that S2 processing tends to increase as a function of task consequence 
(Kahneman, 2011), a main effect for the credit points variable was also anticipated.  Results 
were consistent with the premise that the presence of an error-free machine produced fewer 
errors and shorter responses latencies from reliance on the S1 system.  However, the 
availability of the machine only produced shorter response latencies when the operators’ 
AUD was correct.  If the AUD was incorrect latencies were longer in the aid than the no-aid 
condition.  The credit points variable was not statistically significant in any of the analyses.  
Overall, this study demonstrated the value of an S1-S2 framework in helping to understand 
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why humans make seemingly irrational choices when interacting with automated decision 
aids. 
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The Impact of System 1 Versus System 2 on Automation Usage Decisions 
A voluminous automation literature has developed over the past half century.  Most 
investigations have focused on topics such as the development of new design models (e.g., 
Parasuraman, 2000; Sheridan, 2002), the effects of technology (e.g., Cho & Chang, 2008; 
McBride, Rogers, & Fisk, 2011), willingness to use automation (e.g., Lee & Moray, 1994; 
Maehigashi, Miwa, & Terai, 2014; Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010), and the impact of 
automation on society (e.g., Franchimon & Brink, 2009; Ullmann, 1966).  
Beck, Dzindolet, and Pierce (2002) pointed out that operators frequently have the 
choice to perform a task manually or by using one or more levels of automation.  They 
proposed that these automation usage decisions, which they called AUDs, could be profitably 
examined using a classical decision-making framework.  To illustrate this model, consider a 
two-choice situation in which the operator elects to use the manual control or a form of 
automation.  The optimal choice is the AUD with the greatest probability of a successful 
performance.  Conversely, a suboptimal AUD is a decision to engage an option with a lower 
probability of success.  
One reason that AUDs are important is that they happen with great frequency.  Some 
common AUDs include setting an alarm clock instead of trusting your circadian rhythm, 
using self-checkout instead of relying on a cashier, and choosing an electric toothbrush over 
a manual model.  Although many AUDs are not of great consequence, others change lives 
and alter the course of history.  
 A successful AUD played a critical role in one of the defining events of the last 
millennium.  Before taking “one giant leap for mankind” (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration [NASA], 1995), Neil Armstrong found himself in a precarious situation.  The 
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computing capacity on Apollo 11 was less than many modern laptops.  As data flowed in, the 
computer overloaded and was unable to properly position the spacecraft for a flat, smooth 
landing.  Armstrong quickly engaged manual control, located a suitable landing site, and 
safely brought the spacecraft to the surface of the Moon (NASA, 1995).  Had Armstrong 
taken more than 25 additional seconds to land, a lack of fuel would have stranded him on the 
Moon.  
 Not all AUDs have desirable outcomes.  In 1985, a technician accidentally 
programmed a lethal dose of radiation for a cancer patient (Casey, 1998).  Recognizing her 
mistake, she switched the machine back to a lower dosage.  Unfortunately, the software 
engineer had not programmed the machine to react to sudden corrections.  Rather than 
decrease the dosage level, the machine sent an error message to the technician.  At this point, 
the technician should have taken the manual alternative and shut off the machine.  Instead of 
investigating possible malfunctions, she relied on automation and continued administering 
multiple doses.  This AUD ultimately resulted in the patient’s death from radiation 
poisoning.  
Suboptimal AUDs may be subdivided into misuse and disuse.  As the name implies, 
misuse is overreliance, using an automated device when the task could be better 
accomplished by a nonautomated or less automated alternative.  Disuse is underutilization of 
automation; failing to use automation that would improve the likelihood of a successful 
performance (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
The Washington Metro has had a series of costly and fatal crashes originating from 
suboptimal AUDs.  In 1996, an operator overran the Shady Grove platform.  Instead of 
relying on the manual braking system, she depended on an automated braking system that 
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failed to account for inclement weather.  The operator of the train was killed due to 
automation misuse (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1996).  In 2004, another 
Washington Metro rolled backwards, hitting a service train.  It appears that disuse was the 
culprit because the automatic braking system was turned off (NTSB, 2006).   
 Beck et al. (2002) specified three reasons that are likely causes of misuse and disuse.  
Both automation misuse and disuse can result from recognition, appraisal, or intent errors.  
Recognition errors happen when the operator is unaware of an alternative means of control 
and chooses an option with a lower probability of success.  For example, assume that a global 
positioning system is faster and more accurate than the manual alternative, a paper map.  An 
individual new to technology may continue to rely on a paper map simply because they do 
not recognize that there is an option with a higher probability of success.   
 Appraisal errors occur when the operator incorrectly assesses which option will have 
the highest probability of a successful outcome.  Consider a driver who uses cruise control to 
maintain a safe speed instead of manually pressing the gas pedal.  Although cruise control 
may be efficient for a stretch of open roads, this AUD would be an appraisal error if a driver 
failed to recognize that cruise control is suboptimal in a high-traffic scenario.  
 Although appraisal errors are well-established, intent errors have been seldom studied 
in the automation literature.  Intent errors are made when the operator knows which AUD 
will have the highest probability for success yet chooses the suboptimal option.  This type of 
suboptimal AUD may have contributed to the loss of Amelia Earhart and her navigator, Fred 
Noonan.  In addition to manual methods of using landmarks for navigation, Earhart’s plane 
was equipped with an automated radio system.  For illustrative purposes, let us assume that 
the radio navigation was the more accurate option when flying across the vastness of the 
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Pacific.  If Noonan knew that the radio navigation was superior, yet relied on traditional 
navigation techniques, then he would have committed a lethal intent error.  
 A case can be made that intent errors are of trivial concern because rarely would an 
individual knowingly elect a form of control that reduces the chance of success.  Surely, a 
pilot would not rely on manual control if she or he knew that the automated pilot system 
would be more likely to land the aircraft safely.  Beck, Dzindolet, and Pierce (2005) did not 
test pilots, but they did simulate this situation by providing operators with “advice” from a 
machine that never made errors.  Participants could maximize their success by agreeing with 
the machine’s never failing answer.  Although operators knew that the machine never made 
errors, results show that 82% of participants did not utilize advice from the machine on all 
100 trials.  This finding suggested that a high proportion of individuals are susceptible to 
making intent errors.  
After establishing that intent errors, as well as appraisal errors, are commonplace, 
Beck, Dzindolet, and Pierce (2007) addressed the question of how to control these 
suboptimal AUDs.  The design was a 2 (Feedback: Present, Absent) x 2 (Scenario Training: 
Present, Absent) x 2 (Machine Performance: Inferior, Superior), where the operator’s AUD 
was the main dependent variable.  The task was composed of 200 trials in which participants 
could rely on their own performance or an automated device to determine if a soldier was 
present or absent in a series of briefly displayed photographs.  
 Feedback was used to control for appraisal errors.  In the feedback-present condition, 
operators received a cumulative total of the errors that they and the machine made.  This 
ensured that the participants knew precisely how many total errors had been committed by 
the machine and themselves.  Therefore, suboptimal AUDs should only ensue if the 
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individual disregarded feedback.  In the feedback-absent manipulation, operators were not 
told whether they were more or less accurate than the machine.  In order to make an optimal 
AUD, these individuals had to avoid both appraisal and intent errors.  
 A cognitive-behavioral technique, developed by Beck et al. (2007) called scenario 
training, was employed to decrease intent errors.  Scenario training took the operator through 
the thought processes of an optimal decision maker.  For instance, in one of four scenarios, 
participants were asked whether it would be preferable to rely on investment advice from a 
stockbroker, the nonautomated option, or a computer program, the automated option.  For 
two of the four scenarios, the optimal AUD was automated control and for the other two 
scenarios the optimal decision was manual control.  
 Beck and his colleagues (2007) randomly assigned participants to either an inferior or 
superior machine condition.  In the inferior machine condition, the machine made 
approximately twice as many errors at the operator.  Misuse occurred if the individuals in this 
condition relied on the machine’s performance.  In the superior machine condition, the 
detector made only half as many errors as the operator.  The participants committed disuse if 
they chose to rely on themselves instead of the superior machine.  
Because there were very few suboptimal AUDs in the inferior machine conditions, no 
statistical analyses were performed with these groups.  On the other hand, there was a main 
effect for feedback in the superior machine condition.  Fewer suboptimal AUDs were found 
in the feedback-present groups than the feedback-absent groups.  Although there was no 
main effect for scenario training, there was a statistically significant Feedback x Scenario 
Training interaction.   
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 No statistical difference was found between operators who received neither feedback 
nor scenario training and those who had scenario training but no feedback.  The most 
interesting finding was that scenario training reduced the frequency of suboptimal AUDs in 
groups receiving feedback.  Individuals who were given feedback coupled with scenario 
training made the fewest suboptimal AUDs.  The results of this study demonstrated that there 
are manipulations that mitigate the occurrence of intent errors in human-automation 
interactions.  
 An issue of importance is the causes of intent errors.  Beck, McKinney, Dzindolet, 
and Pierce (2009) suggested that an operator’s proclivity to depend on oneself or a machine 
may be influenced by their views of automation.  American folklore includes a tale about this 
critical type of human-machine interaction.  John Henry was a legendary railroad man who 
died in a race with a steam drill.  Consequently, responding to automation as a challenger is 
called a John Henry Effect (Beck et al., 2009) 
One manifestation of a John Henry Effect is the reluctance of an operator to rely on 
automation to perform a task.  Not all human-machine interactions are likely to result in a 
John Henry Effect.  For example, most people do not experience anguish or the need to 
compete with their washing machines.  On the other hand, the notion of robotic lovers is an 
idea that many people find disconcerting.  Beck et al. (2009) proposed that an operator’s 
personal investment increases the likelihood of a competitive John Henry Effect.  In turn, 
John Henry Effects should augment reliance on the manual alternative, reducing misuse and 
increasing disuse.  
Beck et al. (2009) tested this hypothesis using a 2 (Operator: Self-reliant, Other-
reliant) x 2 (Machine Reliability: Inferior, Superior) x 14 (Block Trials) design.   All 
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participants were told that their objective was to obtain as many credit points as possible.  
Credit points could be exchanged for a monetary reward.  For operators in the self-reliant 
conditions, each trial began with a credit screen in which they elected to base an upcoming 
credit point on their performance or the performance of a combat identification device (CID).  
A counter on this screen kept a running total of errors.  After a number of trials, feedback 
eliminated the possibility of suboptimal AUDs resulting from appraisal errors.  Operators 
knew whether the automated option or the manual option was more accurate.  The CID made 
approximately half the mistakes as the operator in the superior reliability condition and twice 
as many mistakes in the inferior reliability condition.   
 Other-reliant operators differed from the self-reliant condition by having the choice to 
rely on the CID or another human participant.  The participants were yoked; individuals were 
matched with respect to sex and the machine reliability variable.  For instance, assume a 
male in the self-reliant condition worked with the inferior machine, clicked fire on trial 25, 
and saw that the CID held fire.  Then, a male in the other-reliant condition who worked with 
the inferior machine saw that the previous participant fired on trial 25 and that the CID held 
fire.  
 Error variances were greater in the superior machine condition than in the inferior 
machine condition.  As a result, the machine reliabilities were separately examined by using 
two 2 (Operator: Self-reliant, Other-reliant) x 14 (Trial Blocks) ANOVAs.  The dependent 
variable in both analyses was the frequency of suboptimal AUDs.  In each analysis, the most 
important finding was a statistically significant main effect for the operator variable.  In the 
inferior machine condition, self-reliant operators were less likely than other-reliant operators 
to rely on the machine; they committed fewer suboptimal AUDs.  
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In the superior machine condition, suboptimal AUDs occurred when the operator 
chose to rely on a human response rather than automation.  Once again, there was a 
statistically significant main effect for the operator variable.  Self-reliant operators made 
more suboptimal AUDs than other-reliant operators.  In comparison to other-reliant 
participants, self-reliant individuals were more resistant to cumulative feedback.  
As posited by Beck et al. (2009), self-reliant operators were less likely to rely on the 
automated option than other-reliant operators.  It is important to note that greater John Henry 
Effects did not always result in a decline in performance.  When automation was the inferior 
option, relying on human control was the optimal choice.  It was when the human control 
was the suboptimal option that John Henry Effects reduced the probability of task success.   
 In sum, substantial progress has been made in understanding AUDs.  Viewing 
suboptimal AUDs as recognition, appraisal, and intent errors has proven to be a useful 
framework (Beck et al., 2002).  Although recognition errors and appraisal errors are well-
accepted, intent errors remain controversial.  Some might be skeptical of the significance of 
intent errors, contending that they are rare occurrences confined to a few irrational operators.  
Research by Beck et al. (2007) has indicated that intent errors are not atypical, but are 
commonplace and need to be addressed.  Furthermore, it has been shown that intent errors 
can be reduced through interventions, such as scenario training (Beck et al., 2007).  Personal 
investment has been established to be one cause of intent errors; however, the research on the 
causes of intent errors is still in its infancy.   
System 1-System 2 Processing 
Another strategy for investigating causes of intent errors is to explore the decision-
making underpinnings of suboptimal AUDs.  Numerous studies (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 
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2013; Sloman, 1996) have found that the System 1 (S1)-System 2 (S2) framework (Stanovich 
& West, 2000) provides a useful conceptual scheme for examining decision-making (see 
Table 1 for a list of S1-S2 characteristics).  
In general, the default for problem solving is S1.  This system houses innate skills and 
learned biases and heuristics.  The automaticity associated with S1 generally aids people by 
allowing them to interact quickly and almost effortlessly with various stimuli (Kahneman, 
2011).  Consider how quickly you are able to recognize that a yellow light at an intersection 
indicates the need to slow down your car.  Automotive havoc would result if there was a 
constant need to take time to consider the meaning of a yellow light before responding.  
How might you react to an intersection where the traffic lights are not working?  This 
is where S2 takes the lead and allows you to consider options for unexpected situations.  S2 
is the more deliberate, effortful, and conscious of the two systems (Kahneman, 2011).  
Although it is not free from the associations and biases of an individual, it allocates more 
resources to examine a situation in greater depth.  Because S2 employs more time and energy 
than S1, it is most efficient to engage S2 only when the situation justifies the need for 
additional cognitive resources (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
It is important to recognize that the two systems are not independent of one another.  
Rather, the activity of the two systems ebb and flow depending on the perceived task at hand.  
Optimal performance is generally attained when both systems interact to provide appropriate 
behavior.  Most individuals experience regular conflict of the two systems, however, and the 
communication of the systems does not always lead to the most successful response (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008).  As AUD research has demonstrated, decision-making errors are 
common in the human-automation interaction.  The swiftness of System 1 may lead to a rash 
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decision with negative consequences, but the contemplation of System 2 may unnecessarily 
waste cognitive resources.  
For instance, the classic Stroop task could be interpreted through the lens of the dual-
process framework.  In the typical Stroop task, individuals must override semantic processing 
of a word and only name the color in which the word is printed (Stroop, 1935).  
Experimenters generally compare a congruent condition, in which the color word matches 
the ink color (e.g., the color word RED inked in red), and a non-congruent condition, where 
the word is inked in a different color (e.g., the color word RED inked in blue).  Task 
interference occurs when the individual mistakenly says the printed word rather than the font 
color.  Looking from the angle of the S1-S2 framework, this interference can be viewed as a 
result of the automatic processing of reading from S1.  Even with deliberate effort from S2 to 
focus on the color, this interference is difficult for most individuals to overcome.  
As the interest in the dual-process framework has grown, so have the number of 
manipulations.  Atler, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) explored how changing the font 
of a two-statement syllogism may alter the levels of each system used.  They proposed that 
people in the difficult-to-read font (disfluent) condition would engage S2 at higher levels and 
subsequently answer more questions correctly than those in the easy-to-read font (fluent) 
condition.  Consistent with their hypothesis, participants in the disfluent condition had a 
higher frequency of correct responses (64%) than those in the fluent condition (43%).   
In the aptly named article “How to open the door to System 2,” Bourgeois-Gironde 
and Vanderhenst (2009) analyzed experimental conditions that may be likely to override 
System 1 and enlist System 2.  In one of their experiments they altered the commonly used 
stamp and envelope problem by providing possible answer choices for the volunteer to select.  
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The researchers hypothesized that by listing answers to be evaluated, participants would 
initiate System 2 processing and therefore reduce error-prone intuition.  As predicted, 
individuals in the evaluation condition had a higher rate for correct answers (49%) compared 
to those who had no answers to guide their decision-making (31%).   
Design 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to examine the relationship of S1-S2 thinking 
and AUDs.  To my knowledge, a S1-S2 analysis has not been applied to the study of 
operators’ decisions to rely on automated or manual control.  The task was composed of a 
series of target-detection trials.  Participants were informed that the task objective is to 
distinguish “friendly” from “enemy” helicopters.  Credit points, which had a monetary 
consequence, could be earned by correct decisions.   
The design was a 2 (Automation: No-aid, Aid) x 3 (Credit Points: 0, 3, 6).  Operators 
in the aid condition differed from those in the no-aid condition in that they had an error-free 
machine to rely on for correct responses.  That is, they only had to follow the CID’s “advice” 
to avoid committing errors.  The credit points variable indicated the amount of credit points 
operators could gain on a given trial.  The dependent variables were the total of incorrect 
responses and the latency of responses.  Latencies were recorded in seconds.  
Hypotheses 
Errors. A main effect was predicted for the automation variable, with fewer errors 
occurring in the aid condition than the no-aid condition.  Participants in the aid condition 
should have had a much easier task than those in the no-aid condition.  Operators paired with 
the aid were able to rely almost exclusively on S1 processing.  For participants in the aid 
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condition, most disagreements with the error-free CID were intent errors, because they were 
aware that the machine does not make mistakes.  
The proceeding hypothesis assumes that operators paired with aid condition utilized 
information from the CID.  If, however, participants in the aid condition did not use this 
information, then the only effect from the CID would be to serve as a distraction.  Should this 
be the case, performance will be better in the no-aid condition than the aid condition.   
Prior research has indicated that S2 processing tends to increase as a function of task 
consequence (Kahneman, 2011).  This suggests that participants will make fewer errors if the 
trials are worth 6 credit points than if they are worth 0 or 3 credit points.  Thus, a main effect 
for the credit points variable was anticipated.  At present, there is insufficient information to 
make a prediction regarding a possible interaction.   
Latency. Many studies (e.g., Atler et al., 2007; Sloman, 1996) have reported that S2 
processing is associated with longer response latencies than S1 processing.  In the current 
study, S1 processing should be more pronounced in the aid condition because these 
participants had a less cognitively demanding task; they were also able to rely on information 
from the error-free CID.  Therefore, a main effect was predicted for the automation variable 
with shorter latencies in the aid condition than the no-aid condition.  Because S2 processing 
engages as a function of the consequence magnitude (Kahneman, 2011), latencies were 
predicted to be longer in the 6 credit points condition than the 0 and 3 credit points 
conditions.  
Application of an S1-S2 model also suggests that the latencies of participants will 
depend on whether or not they respond correctly on a given trial.  It was hypothesized that 
uncertainty will be positively correlated with the likelihood of errors and that uncertainty will 
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initiate S2 processing (Kahneman, 2011).  This analysis suggests that operators should take 
longer to respond when they answer incorrectly than when they answer correctly.  A 2 
(Automation: Aid, No-Aid) x 2 (Correctness: Correct, Incorrect) mixed design ANOVA was 
performed to test these predictions.   
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred three undergraduates (106 females, 97 males) enrolled in psychology 
classes at Appalachian State University volunteered for course credit.  The sample was 
composed primarily of underclassmen (56%); ages ranged from 18 to 32 years (M = 20.28 
years, SD = 2.033).  Random assignment to conditions was employed with the stipulation 
that the aid and no-aid levels contained an equal number of participants, as well as an equal 
number of females and males.  Procedures were approved by an institutional review board 
(see Appendix A for approval form, 2015) and were treated in accordance with the American 
Psychological Association’s (2010) guidelines of ethical conduct.  
Materials  
The workstation was an Intel Core 2 Duo E6550, 2.33-GHz central processing unit 
equipped with 4.00 GB of random-access-memory, a mouse, and a keyboard.  Resolution 
was true-color (32-bit), 1280 x 1024 pixels.  An internet housed Visual Basic program 
presented the slides and recorded responses. The targets were black-and-white photographs 
of 60 Black Hawk (“friendly”) and 60 Hind (“enemy”) helicopters previously used by Beck 
et al. (2009).   
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Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to either the no-aid condition or the aid 
condition. Operators worked individually at cubicle workstations in groups ranging in size 
from 1 to 10.  The arrangement did not allow operators to view one another’s screen or 
responses.  They were told that they would respond to a series of target identification trials.  
The task simulated decisions made by soldiers in deciding to “fire” at an enemy helicopter or 
“hold fire” in the presence of a friendly helicopter.  
Two practice trials were conducted to ensure that the operators understood the 
instructions.  Before the actual trials begin, the experimenter asked the participants if they 
have any questions (see Appendix B for verbatim instructions).  After completing a consent 
form (see Appendix C), operators began the task.  
No-aid condition. Photographs showing complete friendly and enemy helicopters 
were placed next to the participant’s computer for reference (see Figure 1).  Operators were 
informed that they would be working alongside a “perfect machine” using instructions 
similar to Beck et al. (2005).  
I need to inform you that this machine is perfect.  The combat identification device or 
CID is perfect at detecting the presence and absence of an enemy helicopter.  
Whenever an enemy helicopter is present, the CID will always correctly state that the 
enemy is present.  Whenever an enemy helicopter is absent, the CID will always state 
that the enemy is absent.  Stated another way, if the CID indicates that the enemy 
helicopter is absent, it is correct.  The CID will never erroneously indicate that the 
enemy helicopter is absent.  Similarly, if the CID indicates that the enemy helicopter 
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is present, it is correct.  The CID will never erroneously indicate that the enemy is 
present (p. 213). 
At the start of each trial, a target photograph appeared on the screen with a ‘Continue’ 
button beneath it.  Some of the images showed the entire helicopter, whereas most displayed 
portions of the helicopter. Once the participant viewed the image on the monitors, they would 
click the ‘Continue’ button to proceed to the next screen (see Figure 2.A.1). 
An “Operator” screen then appeared in which the participant was instructed to click a 
button labeled “Fire” if an enemy helicopter was displayed or “Hold Fire” button if a friendly 
helicopter was shown (see Figure 2.B).  Latencies, measured from the onset of the target 
photograph to the offset of the operator screen, were recorded for all trials.  
Operators were also told that their goal was to earn as many credit points as possible.  
If the participant was correct in her or his decision-making, they earned the number of credit 
points shown on the operator screen (see Figure 2.C).  To illustrate, if six credit points were 
available, a text box on the operator screen would state “6 Credit Points will be available on 
this trial.” The number of credit points (0, 3, and 6) varied as a function of 40 trial blocks; the 
sequence was counterbalanced.  In addition, participants were told that a monetary 
compensation of $5.00 would be awarded at the end of the task if their total number of credit 
points was above the median performance of previous operators.  
 Each trial concluded with a “Results” screen (see Figure 2.D).  This screen provided a 
summary of (1) the helicopter’s identity, (2) the CID’s decision, (3) the operator’s attempted 
identification, and (4) whether or not they earned credit points.  After the operator pressed a 
button to advance past the results screen, they were presented with another target photograph 
signaling the start of a new trial.  
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After the 120th trial, all data were automatically submitted to an SQL database.  A 
screen then directed the participant to raise his or her hand to signal task completion.  The 
experimenter checked to see if the student had earned enough credit points to receive 
compensation.  All participants, regardless of credit points, received class participation 
credit.  Upon completion of the session, students were thanked for volunteering.   
Aid condition. The procedure was identical to the no-aid condition except for the 
image at the beginning of each trial.  In this condition, there was a text box displayed above 
the image of the helicopter that indicated whether the CID has decided to “fire” or “hold fire” 
(see Figure 2.A.2).  
Results 
Of the 104 individuals in the aid condition, only 23 (22.1%) agreed with the CID on 
every trial.  It is possible that some incorrect responses were not intent errors.  For instance, 
an operator might inadvertently click the wrong button or they might test to see if in fact the 
machine was indeed error-free.  Presumably, these non-intent errors would not occur 
repeatedly.  Although we cannot be certain that any particular response was an intent error, it 
is reasonable to assume that those operators in the the aid who made three or more 
suboptimal AUDs (44.3%) committed errors of intent.  
Two 2 (Automation: No-aid, Aid) x 3 (Credit Points 0, 3, 6) mixed designs ANOVAs 
were performed; alpha set at .05.  Automation was a between-subjects variable and credit 
points was a within-subjects variable.  Total incorrect responses and latencies served as 
dependent measures.  The data were screened for outliers using a procedure recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2012).  This resulted in the elimination of one participant.   
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It was hypothesized that participants in the aid condition would make fewer errors 
than those in the no-aid condition.  As predicted, a main effect was found for automation 
(Aid: M = 4.11, SD = 5.86; No-Aid: M = 23.99, SD = 7.86), F(1, 200) = 418.265, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .677.  It was also anticipated that participants across conditions of the automation 
variable would make fewer errors when trials were worth 6 points rather than 0 or 3 credit 
points.  This proposition was not supported, F(2, 400) = 2.216, p = .110, ηp2 = .011.  In 
addition, the Automation x Credit Points interaction was not statistically significant, F(2, 
400) = .900, p = .407, ηp2 = .004.  
It was predicted that response latencies would differ in the aid and no-aid conditions.  
In support of that hypothesis, a statistically significant main effect was obtained for 
automation, F(1, 200) = 13.674, p < .001, ηp2 = .064.  Mean latencies were shorter in the aid 
than the no-aid condition (Aid: M = 2.92, SD = 1.52; No-Aid: M = 3.68, SD = 1.39).  It was 
also anticipated that latencies would increase as a function of task consequence.  The main 
effect for credit points was not statistically significant, providing no support for that 
hypothesis, F(2, 400) = .881, p = .415, ηp2 = .004.  Also, the Automation x Credit Points 
interaction was not statistically significant, F(2, 400) = .672, p = .511, ηp2 = .003. 
To further examine intent errors, a 2 (Automation: Aid, No-Aid) x 2 (Correctness: 
Correct, Incorrect) mixed design ANOVA was conducted.  Automation was a between-
subjects variable and correctness was a within-subjects variable.  The latencies for correct 
responses and incorrect responses served as the dependent measures.  To reduce the effects 
of selection bias, a filter was applied to include only individuals in the aid condition who 
made more than 2 errors (44.3%).  Because this action removed the better performers in the 
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aid condition, only the bottom 44.3% of operators in the no-aid condition were entered in this 
analysis.   
A statistically significant main effect was found for the correctness variable in that 
the latencies were longer for incorrect responses (M = 6.57, SD = 5.33) than correct 
responses (M = 3.18, SD = 1.28), F(1, 87) = 32.813, p < .001, ηp2 = .270.  A significant main 
effect was also obtained for automation, F(1, 87) = 8.303, p = .005, ηp2 = .087 (Aid: M = 
5.94, SD = 4.88; No-Aid: M = 3.82, SD = 1.72).  The most interesting finding was a 
statistically significant Automation x Correctness interaction, F(1, 87) = 12.777, p < .001, ηp2 
= .128 (Incorrect Responses: Aid: M = 8.70, SD = 8.28; No-Aid: M = 4.44, SD = 2.37; 
Correct Responses: Aid: M = 3.17, SD = 1.48; No-Aid: M = 3.19, SD = 1.07).   
Exploratory Analysis  
One question that later presented itself was whether or not the operators in the aid 
condition were following an optimal decision-making procedure.  The ideal strategy in the 
aid condition would be one that produces no errors and minimizes effort.  This would be 
achieved if operators paired with the aid condition ignored the photograph and focused 
exclusively on the CID’s decision.  This strategy may be difficult to accomplish because the 
presence of the photograph may elicit S1 processing to shift attention away from the CID 
response.  That is, individuals may direct their attention to the helicopter image even when 
the photograph conveys no useful information.    
To determine if participants in the aid condition followed the optimal strategy, four 
additional volunteers in the aid condition were instructed to complete the task by only 
reading the CID’s decision and ignoring the helicopter image.  Mean latencies were found to 
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be longer for the 23 participants in the aid condition who made no errors (M = 2.70, SD = 
1.22) compared to the four volunteers (M = 1.89, SD = 0.16). 
Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the relationship between S1-S2 thinking and 
intent errors.  Participants in the aid condition were informed that they were paired with a 
machine that made no errors on a target identification task.  In order to receive a monetary 
compensation, individuals paired with the aid only had to agree with the error-free machine 
on every trial, an S1 processing task.  While performing the task, they received trial-by-trial 
feedback making clear that any disagreement with the CID was an error on their part.  On the 
other hand, operators in the no-aid condition had to rely on their own target detection skills.   
It is reasonable to propose that relative to the no aid condition, operators given an aid 
had an easier task, one that is less likely to require S2 processing.  Based on that premise, I 
made a series of predictions regarding participants’ performance on the target detection trials.  
Prior research (Beck et al., 2005) led to the expectation that access to an error-free 
machine would not eliminate misidentifications.  This prediction was confirmed.  Only 
22.1% of participants in the aid condition obtained perfect scores.  Even if we allow for the 
possibility of an accidental response or an initial test of the CID’s accuracy, 44.3% of the 
operators in the aid condition made three or more errors.  This finding strongly suggests that 
among these participants at least some of the incorrect AUDs were errors of intent.  It is 
noteworthy that these operators were aware that misidentifications incurred a monetary cost.   
Comparison to other studies (Beck et al., 2007) suggests the frequency of intent errors 
would be greater if the machine was superior to the operator but not error-free.  In future 
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investigations it would be useful to determine how intent errors varied as a function of 
operator versus machine performance.  
As predicted, a main effect of automation was obtained; operators made fewer errors 
in the aid condition than the no-aid condition.  It was also anticipated that participants across 
conditions would make fewer errors when trials were worth 6 points rather than 0 or 3 credit 
points.  Results did not support this prediction.  Neither the main effect for the credit points 
variable nor the Credit Points x Automation interaction was statistically significant.   
 There are a number of reasons why the credit points manipulation may have been 
ineffective in this study.  For one, the $5.00 compensation may not have been large enough 
to elicit a differential response.  Another probable reason may be that people are not used to 
thinking in terms of credit points.  Dispensing money for each correct response may have a 
more powerful effect on AUDs.  Of course, carry-over effects may have also obscured any 
differential impact of credit points.  
A statistically significant main effect for the automation variable was also found 
when latencies served as dependent measures.  The aid condition had shorter latencies overall 
when compared to the no-aid condition.  This finding was consistent with the premise that 
the aid facilitated S1 processing.  As was previously noted, S1 processing tends to be faster 
than S2 processing.  With S1 processing engaged, participants did not have to expend 
cognitive effort beyond agreeing with the CID.  Latencies did not differ significantly in 
regards to credit points.  
If uncertainty tends to be higher when operators commit misidentifications, latencies 
should be longer for incorrect AUDs than correct AUDs.  A statistically significant main 
effect for the correctness variable provided support for this proposition.  The most interesting 
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finding was that the difference of latencies of correct and incorrect responses depended on 
whether the operator was assigned to the aid or the no-aid condition.  A statistically 
significant interaction (see Table 2) illustrates a major finding in that the operator in the aid 
condition took longer to respond when they made incorrect AUDs than the participants who 
worked without an aid.  This finding demonstrates that in certain circumstances the presence 
of an automated aid can slow operators’ responses.   
Although this study focused on incorrect AUDs, intent errors can be manifested in a 
number of ways.  In the aid condition, the optimal strategy, one that would eliminate errors 
with the least possible effort, would be to always follow the CID’s “advice” and ignore the 
photographs of the helicopters.  An exploratory analysis found that the four additional 
volunteers, who were instructed to only read the CID’s response, exhibited faster latencies 
than participants in the aid condition who made no misidentifications.  This result suggests 
that even operators who made no misidentifications committed intent errors by spending time 
attending to the photographs of the helicopters.  
In this study, operators who responded slowly experienced relatively few negative 
consequences.  However, in other situations longer response latencies could prove 
catastrophic. For example, taking twenty seconds to decide whether or not to fire could be 
fatal in a combat scenario.   Therefore, an important area for future inquiry would be to 
examine AUDs in time intensive situations.  
Limitations  
Consistent with data from S1-S2 research (Kahneman, 2011), latencies are used to 
gauge the decision-processing time of an individual.  Because latency served as a dependent 
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variable in this study, there was no separate manipulation check to indicate a distinction 
between S1 and S2 processing.   
Like every study, questions of external validity must be considered.  Because the 
sample consisted of university students, it is reasonable to consider whether similar results 
would be obtained with other populations.  In addition, the lack of realism in the target-
detection task may have lower the consequence magnitude, affecting the latencies and 
reflection of S1-S2 processing.  For example, decision-making in a laboratory cannot 
simulate the life and death decisions of the battlefield.   
Future Research 
The results of the present study are consistent with the findings of early investigations 
(e.g., Beck et al., 2005; 2009) in that intent errors had a detrimental effect on performance.  
Beck et al. (2007) developed a cognitive-behavioral technique, scenario-training, that when 
combined with feedback, reduced intent errors.  This intervention guided the participant 
through the thought processes of an optimal performer.  Clearly additional procedures need 
to be developed to mitigate the occurrence of intent as well as appraisal errors.   
Additional studies are needed to further explore the relationship between intent errors 
and response latencies.  As previously seen, longer latencies, presumably from greater S2 
processing, were related to incorrect responses across conditions.  It is necessary to examine 
more closely the changes in latency, especially when feedback from the machine counters 
what the participant perceives to be true.   
Beck et al. (2009) examined the effects of personal investment on intent errors.  Work 
on this issue needs to be expanded to determine how operator characteristics affect intent 
errors.  Finding the right balance of control between the individual and the machine may be a 
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necessary adjustment for successful human-machine interactions, one that may depend on an 
operator’s personality, attributes of the machine, and work environments.   
With that said, it would be worthwhile to investigate how varying the machine’s 
efficiency may impact the operator’s response.  For example, would an individual be more 
likely to rely on a machine that had an 80% probability of success versus 100% as seen in 
this study?  Perhaps, we would find that the perfect machine poses too much of a threat to a 
human’s ego for control and a slightly lower probability for success would be less 
intimidating.  
Furthermore, an interesting study would be to explore operators’ personal attributions 
as to why they are committing intent errors.  From an outsider’s perspective, intent errors 
may appear irrational.  As show in this study, a substantial percentage of operators repeatedly 
committed intent errors, reducing their chances of obtaining a monetary reward.  How do we 
account for this type of behavior?  One possibility is that there are contingences other than 
performance consequences operating.  Despite their illogical appearance, it should not be 
assumed that intent errors are irrational from the perspective of the operator.  
Conclusions 
In this study, an S1-S2 framework was reasonably successful in predicting the effects 
of an automated decision aid on intent errors and response latencies.  Usually suboptimal 
AUDs are attributed to appraisal errors.  That is, it is assumed that the operator misjudged the 
relative accuracy of the automated option versus the manual option.  The results of this 
investigation are consistent with other previous experiments (e.g., Beck et al., 2002; 2005) in 
demonstrating that this is an overly simplistic model of human-automation interaction.  Often 
operators know how to best respond, yet for reasons we do not fully comprehend, they 
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knowingly impair their performance rather than relying on machines.  The findings of this 
and other studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2007; 2009) will help to elucidate the reasons that 
operators appear to respond irrationally when interacting with machines that simulate human 
cognitions.   
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Table 1 
System 1 and System 2 Characteristics 
System 1 System 2 
Fast Slow 
High Capacity Limited Capacity 
Biased Normative 
Automatic Controlled 
Associative Rule-Based 
Note. Based on research by Evan and Stanovich (2013) and Kahneman (2011). 
  
IMPACT OF S1 VERSUS S2 ON AUDS 
 
	  
33 
Table 2  
Latencies as a Function of Automation and Response Correctness  
 Aid No-Aid    
 M SD M SD F df p 
Correctness     12.777 (1, 87) .001 
Correct Responses 3.17 1.48 3.19 1.07    
Incorrect Responses 8.70 8.28 4.44 2.37    
Note. Latencies recorded in seconds. 
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Figure 1. Reference helicopter photographs located on each participant’s workstation. 
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Figure 2. Sequence of screens composing a detection trial: photograph displayed for a no-aid 
participant (A.1) versus an aid operator (A.2), Operator (B), and Results Screens (C) shown 
for both conditions. 
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responsible for compliance with the University policies and procedures, and IRB determinations. 
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research activities with human participants must cease. 
Prompt Reporting of Events: Unanticipated Problems involving risks to participants or others; serious or
continuing noncompliance with IRB requirements and determinations; and suspension or termination of IRB
approval by an external entity, must be promptly reported to the IRB. 
Closing a study: When research procedures with human subjects are completed, please complete the Request
for Closure of IRB review form and send it to irb@appstate.edu. 
Websites: 
1. PI responsibilities: 
http://researchprotections.appstate.edu/sites/researchprotections.appstate.edu/files/PI%20Responsibilities.pdf 
2. IRB forms: http://researchprotections.appstate.edu/human-subjects/irb-forms 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions for Target Detection Task
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Instructions for the No-Aid Condition 
This experiment looks at performance of participants on a target identification task.  
You will notice that there are pictures of helicopters next to your monitor.  Throughout the 
trials you will be required to identify “friendly” from “enemy” helicopters.  On every trial, a 
combat identification device, also known as a CID, will also make a decision on every 
helicopter that you are shown.  I need to inform you that this machine is perfect.  The CID is 
perfect at detecting the presence and absence of an enemy helicopter.  I am now going to go 
over the instructions on how to complete the task.   
 The goal of this experiment is to earn as many “credit points” as possible.  Some 
trials will be worth three credit points and some will be worth six credit points.  In addition, 
there will also be experimental trials that will be worth zero credit points.  If your 
performance is above the median of previous players, you will earn $5.00 after the 
completion of the task.  On the other hand, if your performance falls below the median, you 
will not receive any monetary compensation.  Regardless of the total of credit points that you 
earn, you will receive three ELCs for participation in this study.  
The first screen on each trial will contain a photograph of a helicopter.  Half of the 
slides will be of friendly helicopters and half will be of enemy helicopters.  Pictures of both a 
friendly and an enemy helicopter are placed next to your monitor for reference.  In this study, 
there will be one type of friendly helicopter and one type of enemy helicopter.  However, the 
markings and the way that the friendly and enemy helicopters are painted will vary from 
slide to slide.  Some of the photographs you will observe will be of complete helicopters.  In 
other pictures, only part of the helicopter will be shown (i.e., you may see a whole helicopter 
or just a wheel or propeller).   
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There are two possible errors that can be made.  One error is to fire upon a friendly 
helicopter.  The other type of error is to hold fire when the helicopter was an enemy.  Both 
errors should be avoided.  They are equally serious.   
After you have been given the opportunity to view a slide of the helicopter, you will 
click continue to see the operator screen.  On this screen you will have the opportunity to 
make your decision regarding the identity of the previously seen helicopter.  If you detect 
that the helicopter is an enemy, you will click the “Fire” button.  However, if you think that 
the helicopter is friendly, you should click the “Hold Fire” button.  In addition, below these 
two buttons you will see a total number of credit points available on this trial.  This will 
indicate how much a correct decision will be worth.   
Once you have made your target detection decision, the “Results” screen will then 
appear.  On this screen you will see 1) the identity of the helicopter, 2) what the CID decided 
to do, 3) whether you decided to fire or hold fire, and 4) how many credit points you earned, 
if any, on that trial.  
We will begin with two practice trails to be certain you understand these directions.  
Please ask questions during the practice session.  You will not be able to ask questions during 
the actual session.  Once the program begins, no interaction can take place.  
Now please answer the questions in front of you.  I will talk through the two practice 
trials.  There trials are simply for your understanding.  I will tell you what to click and ask 
you questions throughout these samples to make sure you fully comprehend the task and how 
to earn credit points.  The outcomes of these trials do not count toward the five dollars or 
affect the number of credit points.  Please ask questions as we go.   
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To start the practice trails, type in the code ‘426’.  You will first see the image of the 
helicopter on the monitor.  Notice on your reference sheet that this is a friendly helicopter.  
Please press the continue button.  Now you are seeing the Operator screen.  Notice the 
amount of credit points offered at the top of this screen.  The decision on this trial is worth 3 
points.  Below the credit points, there are the two buttons labeled “fire” and “hold fire”.  You 
would click fire if you thought the helicopter was a what?  Enemy correct.  You would click 
hold fire if you thought the helicopter was a what?  Friend, correct.  Click hold fire.  Now 
you see the Results screen.   It says that the helicopter was a friend, the CID decided to hold 
fire, you decided to hold fire, and you earned 3 credit points.  Do you have any questions?  
Ok, please click continue.  
Notice on your reference sheet that this is an enemy helicopter.  Now on the Operator 
screen you can see that this trial is worth 0 credit points.  Please click fire.  The Results 
screen indicates that the helicopter was an enemy, the CID decided to fire, you decided to 
fire, and you earned 0 credit points because there were no credit points available.   
Now that we have gone over the practice trials and you understand your task, it is 
time for me to collect your consent form.  Like all participants in psychological 
investigations, you are guaranteed certain rights.  Among these is the right to confidentiality; 
neither I nor anyone else will know your answers.  You also have the right to terminate the 
experiment at any time.  
 During the task, please do not click the back button.  This will terminate the task and 
you will lose your chance to earn $5.00.  In addition, some pictures will require that you 
scroll down to click the continue button.  After the last trial, please remain seated until 
IMPACT OF S1 VERSUS S2 ON AUDS 
 
	  
43 
further instructions.  Are there any questions?  Now you may type in the code ‘1990’ and 
begin.  
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Instructions for the Aid Condition 
 
This experiment looks at performance of participants on a target identification task.  
You will notice that there are pictures of helicopters next to your monitor.  Throughout the 
trials you will be required to identify “friendly” from “enemy” helicopters.  On every trial, a 
combat identification device, also known as a CID, will also make a decision on every 
helicopter that you are shown.   
I need to inform you that this machine is perfect.  The CID is perfect at detecting the 
presence and absence of an enemy helicopter.  Whenever an enemy helicopter is present, the 
CID will always correctly state that the enemy is present.  Whenever an enemy helicopter is 
absent, the CID will always state that the enemy is absent.  Stated another way, if the CID 
indicates that the enemy helicopter is absent, it is correct.  The CID will never erroneously 
indicate that the enemy helicopter is absent.  Similarly, if the CID indicates that the enemy 
helicopter is present, it is correct.  The CID will never erroneously indicate that the enemy is 
present.  I am now going to go over the instructions on how to complete the task.   
 The goal of this experiment is to earn as many “credit points” as possible.  Some 
trials will be worth three credit points and some will be worth six credit points.  In addition, 
there will also be experimental trials that will be worth zero credit points.  If your 
performance is above the median of previous players, you will earn $5.00 after the 
completion of the task.  On the other hand, if your performance falls below the median, you 
will not receive any monetary compensation.  Regardless of the total of credit points that you 
earn, you will receive three ELCs for participation in this study.  
 
IMPACT OF S1 VERSUS S2 ON AUDS 
 
	  
45 
The first screen on each trial will contain a photograph of a helicopter.  Half of the 
slides will be of friendly helicopters and half will be of enemy helicopters.  Pictures of both a 
friendly and an enemy helicopter are placed next to your monitor for reference.  In this study, 
there will be one type of friendly helicopter and one type of enemy helicopter.  However, the 
markings and the way that the friendly and enemy helicopters are painted will vary from 
slide to slide.  Some of the photographs you will observe will be of complete helicopters.  In 
other pictures, only part of the helicopter will be shown (i.e., you may see a whole helicopter 
or just a wheel or propeller).  In addition, you will see text on this image that states what the 
CID has detected.  For example, it may say that CID has decided to fire, which would mean 
that the helicopter has been identified as an enemy helicopter.   
There are two possible errors that can be made.  One error is to fire upon a friendly 
helicopter.  The other type of error is to hold fire when the helicopter was an enemy.  Both 
errors should be avoided.  They are equally serious.   
After you have been given the opportunity to view a slide of the helicopter, you will 
click continue to see the operator screen.  On this screen you will have the opportunity to 
make your decision regarding the identity of the previously seen helicopter.  If you detect 
that the helicopter is an enemy, you will click the “Fire” button.  However, if you think that 
the helicopter is friendly, you should click the “Hold Fire” button.  In addition, below these 
two buttons you will see a total number of credit points available on this trial.  This will 
indicate how much a correct decision will be worth.   
Once you have made your target detection decision, the “Results” screen will then 
appear.  On this screen you will see 1) the identity of the helicopter, 2) what the CID decided 
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to do, 3) whether you decided to fire or hold fire, and 4) how many credit points you earned, 
if any, on that trial.  
We will begin with two practice trails to be certain you understand these directions.  
Please ask questions during the practice session.  You will not be able to ask questions during 
the actual session.  Once the program begins, no interaction can take place.  
Now please answer the questions in front of you.  I will talk through the two practice 
trials.  There trials are simply for your understanding.  I will tell you what to click and ask 
you questions throughout these samples to make sure you fully comprehend the task and how 
to earn credit points.  The outcomes of these trials do not count toward the five dollars or 
affect the number of credit points.  Please ask questions as we go.   
To start the practice trails, type in the code ‘426’.  You will first see the image of the 
helicopter on the monitor.  Please note that the text says that the CID will hold fire and your 
reference indicates that this is a friendly helicopter.  Please press the continue button.  Now 
you are seeing the Operator screen.  Notice the amount of credit points offered at the top of 
this screen.  The decision on this trial is worth 3 points.  Below the credit points, there are the 
two buttons labeled “fire” and “hold fire”.  You would click fire if you thought the helicopter 
was a what?  Enemy correct.  You would click hold fire if you thought the helicopter was a 
what?  Friend, correct.  Click hold fire.  Now you see the Results screen.   It says that the 
helicopter was a friend, the CID decided to hold fire, you decided to hold fire, and you 
earned 3 credit points.  Do you have any questions?  Ok, please click continue.  
Notice the picture is the enemy helicopter on your reference and that the CID decided 
to fire.  Now on the Operator screen you can see that this trial is worth 0 credit points.  Please 
click fire.  The Results screen indicates that the helicopter was an enemy, the CID decided to 
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fire, you decided to fire, and you earned 0 credit points because there were no credit points 
available.   
Now that we have gone over the practice trials and you understand your task, it is 
time for me to collect your consent form.  Like all participants in psychological 
investigations, you are guaranteed certain rights.  Among these is the right to confidentiality; 
neither I nor anyone else will know your answers.  You also have the right to terminate the 
experiment at any time.  
 During the task, please do not click the back button.  This will terminate the task and 
you will lose your chance to earn $5.00.  In addition, some pictures will require that you 
scroll down to click the continue button.  After the last trial, please remain seated until 
further instructions.  Are there any questions?  Now you may type in the code ‘1990’ and 
begin.  
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Consent Form 
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APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
Informed Consent for Participants in Research Projects Involving Human Subjects 
Title of Project: Humans Computer Interaction 
Investigator(s): Hall P. Beck, Courtney C. Cornelius, Eric Isley & Amanda Osgood 
I. Purpose of this Research/Project 
The purpose of this investigation is to assess the effectiveness of a simulated combat 
identification device on a photo recognition task.  
II. Procedures 
This investigative session involves completing a task on the computer and will require 
approximately one hour of your time.  You will be shown photographs of helicopters on the 
computer monitor.  Your task is to distinguish “friendly” from “enemy” helicopters.   
III. Risks 
It is extremely unlikely that you will incur psychological, legal, or social harm from your 
participation in this study.  Slight psychological discomfort may be present but the 
discomforts are minimal.  If you feel uncomfortable then you may withdraw at any time 
without penalty to yourself or a record of your participation.  In addition, you may consult 
the researchers conducting this experiment. 
IV. Benefits 
Your participation in this study will allow you to gain a greater appreciation for how 
psychological investigations are conducted.  Not only will you study scientific research in the 
classroom, you will be able to actively learn about it in the laboratory.  Society will benefit in 
that the results of this study may help psychologists better understand how people interact 
IMPACT OF S1 VERSUS S2 ON AUDS 
 
	  
50 
with computers and other forms of technology.  Since many jobs are becoming technological 
or completely automated, this research could have important ramifications.  
V. Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Your answers will be saved on a data file along with the information about your age, sex, and 
any potential military experience.  Though you will have the option of signing this consent 
form, your name will not be associated with or otherwise linked to your responses to task.  
VI. Compensation 
You can earn up to 3 ELCs for your participation.  There are other research options and non-
research options for obtaining extra credit or ELCs.  One non-research option to receive 1 
ELC is to read an article and write a 1-2 page paper summarizing the article and your 
reaction to the article.  More information about this option can be found at: 
psych.appstate.edu/research.  You may also wish to consult your professor to see if other 
non-research options are available.  
In addition, if your performance is above the median for your condition, you will receive 
$5.00. 
VII. Freedom to Withdraw 
You are free to leave/withdraw from the investigation at any time without penalty. 
VIII. Approval of Research 
This research project has been approved on February 6, 2015 by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Appalachian State University.   This approval will expire on February 5, 2016 
unless the IRB renews the approval of this research. 
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IX. Participant’s Responsibilities 
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study and complete the target identification task.  By 
signing this form, I confirm that I am at least 18 years of age. 
X. Participant’s Permission 
I have read and understand the Informed Consent and conditions of this project.  I have had 
all my questions answered.  I hereby acknowledge the above and give my voluntary consent. 
____________________________________________________Date___________________ 
Participant’s Signature 
Should you have any questions about this research or its conduct, you may contact: 
Hall P. Beck, Ph. D.       beckhp@appstate. edu 
Investigator                E-mail 
Questions regarding the protection of human subjects may be addressed to the IRB 
Administrator, Research Protections, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608 (828) 
262-2692, irb@appstate.edu 
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